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POLICE SCIENCE NOTES*
Admissibility of Recorded Wire troduction of the pamograph rec-
Tapping Evidence-The Supreme ords. Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88,
Court of Minnesota in the recent 161 N. E. 375, 382.
decision of State v. Raasch, 275 N. "For the convenience of court
W. 620 (Minn., f937) upheld the and counsel, the recorded conver-
admissibility of a recording of wire sations were transcribed in type-
tapping evidence. Because of the written form and were used to fol-
importance of this decision in the low the conversations as they were
field of police science, the follow- reproduced by the pamograph
ing excerpts from the court's opin- in court. The pamograph was
ion are here reproduced: equipped with a sufficient number
"Upon examination of the record of headsets so that the jury, court,
we find that the witnesses who and counsel could listen to the rec-
testified to the transcribing of the ord while the conversations vere
telephone conversations upon the being reproduced. At times the
pamograph records sufficiently court did riot use the headset which
identified the defendant's voice, was provided for it, but, in the
True, they did not know his voice presence of jury and counsel, fol-
at the time they staited making the lowed the typewritten transcript.
records, but not only did the de- Objection was made by the de-
fendant respond to his name when fendant to the court not listening
his office was called on the tele- through the headset. While it
phone, but after the making of the would have been preferable for the
records these witnesses saw the de- court to have listened, we do not
fendant and heard him talk re- think there was any prejudice to
.peatedly, so at the time they testi- the defendant in its not doing so.
fled they were able to testify posi- The jury and counsel for both par-
tively that the voice they had heard ties heard the conversations as re-
over the telephone at the time the produced, the court was at all times
pamograph records were taken was present and in control of the trial,
the defendant's voice. They also and had any objection been made
recognized and identified the voices or question raised it could have
of other participants in the con- acted. There were occasions upon
versations who were identified with the trial when the needle of the
the gamblers. They said that the reproducing mechanism jumped
conversations they heard were from one groove of the record to
truly recorded by the pamograph another, thus omitting a part of
and truly reproduced by that in- the conversation, but in such cases
strument in court. In our opin- the record was played over and
ion this was a sufficient identifica- the whole conversation reproduced.
tion of the defendant as a partici- The typewritten transcripts were
pant in the conversations, and laid not introduced, but used as mem-
a sufficient foundation for the in- oranda to refresh the memory of
* Edited by Fred E. Inbau and M. Edwin O'Neill of the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory of Northwesterm University School of Law.
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the witnesses who had heard the
conversations that were recorded.
In each instance they were checked
back against the pamograph rec-
ords. We think their use was not
prejudicial.
"The fact that there was no rec-
ord made of those parts of the
telephone conversations which re-
lated to subjects other than those
of which the defendant stands here
accused did not render the rele-
vant part of the conversations in-
admissible. The operators of these
machines were informed as to the
nature of the conversation which
they were asked to record, and so
when the conversation began to
relate to other subjects they did
not record it. If there was further
conversation which the defendant
thought bore upon the matter, he
was, of course, perfectly at liberty
to show it by the other party to the
conversation if he did not care to
go upon the stand."
Blood Grouping Tests-Paternity
Determinations- Effect of Expert
Testimony- Two very interesting
decisions were rendered recently
by the California Supreme Court
and by the District Court of Ap-
peals. In the case of Arais v.
Kalensnikoff, 74 Pac. (2d) 1043
(Calif., 1937) an interesting and
important question arose regarding
the utilization of the results of
blood grouping tests in a paternity
determination. At the trial the re-
sults of the test were admitted and
they indicated the impossibility of
the defendant's being the father of
the child in question. Neverthe-
less, because of other evidence in-
troduced at the trial the court
found in favor of the plaintiff. Up-
on appeal to the Second Appellate
District Court the case was re-
versed and for the following rea-
sons as they appear in the appel-
late court's opinion:
"Is there substantial evidence in
the record to sustain the finding of
the trial court that defendant is the
father . . . ?
"The questibn must be answered
in the negative. The law is settled
that courts will take judicial no-
tice of all matters of science and
common knowledge .... It is like-
wise settled that it is not the prov-
ince of this court to decide dis-
puted questions of fact, and we are
bound to give plaintiff the benefit
of all favorable inferences which
may be drawn from her testimony
and that of other witnesses; yet we
are not required to believe what
physical facts demonstrate to be
untrue or that which is contrary
to immutable physical laws ....
Hence a finding of fact based solely
upon the testimony of a witness
contrary to a scientific fact will be
set aside by this court on appeal
as not supported by substantial
evidence.
"Applying the foregoing rules to
the instant case, we take judicial
notice of the Landsteiner Blood
Groupings and the results derived
therefrom upon test.
"In passing, our research dis-
closes that the blood-grouping test
requires only a few drops of blood,
is painless and in no way is preju-
dicial to health. Therefore, since
the charge of paternity is one easy
to make and very difficult to dis-
prove, it would tend to simplify
this problem . .. ."
An appeal was then taken to the
Supreme Court of California which
sustained the trial court's decision
and for the following reasons as
stated in the Supreme Court's
opinion:
"Whatever claims the medical
profession may make for the test,
in California 'no evidence is by
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law made conclusive or unanswer-
able, unless so declared by this
code.' Section 1978, Code Civ.
Proc. . . The law makes no dis-
tinction whatever between expert
testimony and evidence of other
character. .... Although it en-
courages the demonstration of the
truth of the issues before a court
by any means which are generally
accepted as tending to prove the
facts in dispute, 'when there is a
conflict between scientific testi-
mony and testimony as to the facts,
the jury or trial court, must deter-
mine the relative weight of the
evidence.' Parentage is not ex-
clusively a subject of expert evi-
dence. The trial judge heard the
testimony of the mother of the
child and the witnesses who cor-
roborated her concerning the nu-
merous visits of the appellant to
her house, and his actions with the
child. The admissions of the de-
fendant as related by these wit-
nesses are also a part of the evi-
dence. It was the duty of the judge
to determine the fact of parentage
upon all this evidence and to re-
solve the conflict arising from the
testimony of the mother and her
vitnesses on the one hand and the
evidence of the defendant, includ-
ing the blood test, on the other.
The finding so made was based up-
on substantial evidence and may
not be successfully challenged up-
on appeal."
Firearms Identification-Qualifica-
tions of Expert Witness- In the
case of State v. Couch, Ill: S. W.
(2d) 147 (Mo., 1937) an expert
witness testified to the effect that
various shells were fired from cer-
tain guns in evidence, which tes-
timony served to secure a convic-
tion against the defendant. Upon
appeal the defendant contended
that since the witness was not a
"ballistic expert" he should not
have been permitted to testify. To
this objection the Supreme Court
of Missouri said:
"The witness did testify that he
was not a ballistic expert, but that
he had much experience in the
work of identifying firearms; that
the term "ballistic expert' did not
apply to his line of work. In this
the witness may be technically cor-
rect. But, be that as it may, the
witness' testimony disclosed that he
was an expert in the identification
of firearms and bullets by the com-
parison method by means of a mi-
croscope. The method used in this
case to identify the shells and re-
volvers was similar to the method
employed in the case of State v.
Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S. W. (2d)
74. The question was there fully
considered and it was held that the
witness was qualified to testify.
The rule is now well settled that
such evidence is competent and
may be considered by the jury in
arriving at a verdict."
Firearhis Identification - Expert
Testimony as to the Distance a Fired
Shell Had Been Ejected- In the
case of Commonwealth v. Peronace,
195 Atl. 57 (Pa., 1937) an expert
testified that a revolver such as
that used by the defendant would
throw shells a certain distance (8
feet) if held in a normal position.
To this testimony the defendant ob-
jected because "there was no spe-
cific evidence to show that appel-
lant held the gun in a normal posi-
tion." Upon appeal from the trial
court's conviction the Supreme
Court stated that "In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, appel-
lant having admitted firing the gun,
the jury could infer that he held it
in a normal position"
